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Abstract. Fighting against computer malware require a mandatory step
of reverse engineering. As soon as the code has been disassemblied/de-
compiled (including a dynamic analysis step), there is a hope to un-
derstand what the malware actually does and to implement a detection
mean. This also applies to protection of software whenever one wishes to
analyze them. In this paper, we show how to amour code in such a way
that reserse engineering techniques (static and dymanic) are absolutely
impossible by combining malicious cryptography techniques developped
in our laboratory and new types of programming (k-ary codes). Suitable
encryption algorithms combined with new cryptanalytic approaches to
ease the protection of (malicious or not) binaries, enable to provide both
total code armouring and large scale polymorphic features at the same
time. A simple 400 Kb of executable code enables to produce a binary
code and around 2140 mutated forms natively while going far beyond the
old concept of decryptor.
1 Introduction
Malicious cryptography and malicious mathematics malicious are an emerging
field [2, 3,4] that finds its origin in the initial work of Young and Yung on the
use of asymmetric cryptography in the design of dedicated offensive functions
for money extorsion (cryptovirology) [5]. But this initial approach is very limited
and gives only a very small insight of the way mathematics and cryptography
can be actually perverted by malware.
Malicious cryptology and malicious mathematics make in fact explode Young
and Yung’s narrow vision. This results in an unlimited, fascinating yet disturbing
field of research and experimentation. This new domain covers several fields and
topics (non-exhaustive list):
– Use of cryptography and mathematics to develop “super malware” (u¨ber-
malware) which evade any kind of detection by implementing:
• Optimized propagation and attack techniques (e.g. by using biased or
specific random number generator) [11].
• Sophisticated self-protection techniques. The malware code protect itself
and its own functional activity by using strong cryptography-based tools
[7].
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• Code invisibility techniques using testing simulability [10].
• Code mutation techniques (by combining the different methods of the
previous three items).
– Use of complexity theory or computability theory to design undetectable
malware [15].
– Use of malware to perform applied cryptanalysis operations (theft of secrets
elements such as passwords or secret keys, static or on-the-fly modification
of systems to reduce their cryptographic strength [17] ...) by a direct action
on the cryptographic algorithm or its environment.
– Design and implementation of encryption systems with hidden mathematical
trapdoors. The knowledge of the trap (by the system designer only) enables
to break the system very efficiently. Despite the fact that system is open and
public, the trapdoor must remain undetectable. This can also apply to the
keys themselves in the case of asymmetric cryptography [6].
To summarize, we can define malicious cryptography and malicious mathematics
as the interconnection and interdependence of computer virology with cryptol-
ogy and mathematics for their mutual benefit. The possibilities are virtually
infinite. It is worth mentioning that this vision and the underlying techniques
can be translated for “non-malicious” use as the protection of legitimate codes
(e.g. for copyright protection purposes) against static (reverse engineering) and
dynamic (sandboxing, virtualization) analyses. If simple and classical obfusca-
tion techniques are bound to fail as proved by Barak and al. [1] theoretically (for
a rather restricted model of computation), new models of computation [12,18]
and new malware techniques [2] have proved that efficient code protection can
be achieved practically.
If the techniques arising from this new domain are conceptually attractive
and potentially powerful, their operational implementation is much more diffi-
cult and tricky. This requires a very good mastery of algorithms and low-level
programming. Above all the prior operational thinking of the attack is unavoid-
able. The same code implementing the same techniques in two different con-
texts will have quite different outcomes. In particular, we must never forget that
the code analysis is static (disassembly/decompilation) but also dynamic (de-
bugging, functional analysis ...). Code encryption usually protects – possibly –
against static code analysis only.
In this paper we will show how the techniques of malicious cryptography
enable to implement total amoring of programs, thus prohibiting any reverse
engineering operation. The main interest of that approach lies in the fact that
TRANSEC properties are achieved at the same time. In other words, the pro-
tected binary has the same entropy as any legitimate, unprotected code. This
same technique can also achieve a certain level of polymorphism/metamorphism
at the same time: a suitable 59-bit key stream cipher is sufficient to generate
up to 2140 variants very simply. More interestingly, the old fashioned concept of
decryptor which usually constitutes a potential signature and hence a weakness,
is totally revisited.
These techniques have been implemented by the author in the LibThor which
has been written and directed by Anthony Desnos [4,20].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls some important aspect
about code protection and discusses key points about code armouring and code
mutation. Then Section 3 presents the context we consider to apply our tech-
nique: we aim at protecting critical portions of code that are first transformed
into an intermediate representation (IR), then into the bytecode. This code itself
is that of virtual machine used to provide efficent protection against dynamic
analysis. Section 4 presents the different models and techniques of malicious
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). Finally Section 5 presents imple-
mentation issue which must be considered to achieve protection against both
static and dynamic analyses.
2 Code Armouring and Code Mutation
We will not recall in details what these two techniques are. The reader may
consult [8] for a complete presentation with respect to them. As far as malicious
cryptography is concerned, we are just going to discuss some critical points which
are bottlenecks in their effective implementation. Most of the times the attempts
to play with these techniques fail due to a clumsy use of cryptography.
Code armouring [7] consists in writing a code so as to delay, complicate or
even prevent its analysis. As for code mutation techniques they strive to limit
(polymorphism) or to remove (metamorphism) any fixed component (invariant)
from one mutated version to another. The purpose is to circumvent the notion of
antiviral signature, may it be a a simple sequence of contiguous or nor contiguous
bytes or meta-structures such as Control Flow Graphs (CFG) and other traces
describing the code functional (behavioral) structure.
In all these cases, the general approach is to encrypt the code to protect or to
use special techniques for generating random data. But encryption and genera-
tion of randomness relates to two major practical problems: their characteristic
entropy profile and the secret elements (keys) management.
2.1 Entropy profile
The whole problem lies in the fact that code armouring and code mutation
involve random data. These must be generated on-the-fly and in the context
of metamorphism, the generator itself must be too. For sake of simplicity, we
shall speak of Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) to describe both a
random number generator and an encryption system. The difference lies in the
fact that in the latter case either random data produced from the expansion of
the key are combined with the plaintext (stream ciphers) or they are the result
of the combination of the key with the plaintext (block ciphers).
The whole issue lies in the generation of a so-called “good” randomness.
Except that in the context of malicious cryptography [9], the term “good” does
not necessarily correspond to what cryptographers usually mean. In fact, it is
better – yet a simplified but sufficient reduction as a first approximation – to
use the concept of entropy [14]. In the same way, the term of random data will
indifferently describe the random data themselves or the result of encryption.
Consider a (malicious) code as an information source X. When parsed, the
source outputs characters taking the possible values xi (i = 0, . . . , 255), each
with a probability pi = P [X = xi]. Then the entropy H(X) of the source is the
following sum1:
H(X) =
255∑
i=0
−pi log2(pi)
Random data, by nature will exhibit a high entropy value2. On the contrary,
non random data exhibit a low entropy profile (they are easier or less difficult
to predict).
From the attacker’s point of view3 the presence of random data means that
something is hidden but he has to make the difference between legitimate data
(e.g. use of packers to protect code against piracy) and illegitimate data (e.g.
malware code). In the NATO terminology – at the present time it is the most
precise and accurate one as far as InfoSec is concerned– random data relate to
a COMSEC (COMmunication SECurity) aspect only.
For the attacker (automated software or human expert), the problem is
twofold: first detect random data parts inside a code and then decrypt them. In
this respect, any code area exhibiting a high entropy profile must be considered
as suspicious. To prevent attention to be focused on those random parts, is it
possible to add some TRANSEC (TRANSmission SECurity) aspect. The most
famous one is steganography but for malware or program protection purposes
it is not directly usable (data cannot be directly executed) and we have to find
different ways. The other solution is to use malicious statistics as defined and
exposed in [14].
It is also possible to break randomness by using noisy encoding techniques
like Perseus [21]. In this case the code remains executable while being protected
AND exhibiting low entropy profile at the same time (or the entropy profile
of any arbitrary kind of data). As for an exemple, on a 175-bytes script, the
unprotected code has an entropy of 3.90. An encrypted version (by combining
simple transpositions with simple substitutions) of that code has an entropy
equal to 5.5. When protected by Perseus the entropy is about 2.57. So it is very
close to a normal program and thus evade entropy-based detection.
This applies well on any data used for code mutation (e.g. junk code inser-
tion), including specific subsets of code as CFGs: randomly mutated CFG must
1 Let us note that here the entropy considers single characters or 1-grams only. A more
accurate value would consider all the possible n-grams and would compute entropy
when n→∞.
2 This means that the uncertainty is maximal whenever trying to predict the next
value output by the source X.
3 Do not forget to reverse the view dually: here the attacker is any code analyst who
wants to have a deep insight into the binary code. However we must keep in mind
that what can do a human analyst, will be most of the time very difficult (from a
computing point of view at least) for automated program as AV software are.
exhibit the same profile as any normal CFG would. Otherwise, considering the
COMSEC aspect only is bound to make the code detection very easy.
2.2 Key management
Encrypting a code or a piece of code implies its preliminary deciphering whenever
it is executed. But in all of the cases – except those involving money extortion
introduced Young and Yung [23] – the key must be accessible to the code itself
to decipher. Consequently in a way or another it is contained in a more or less
obfuscated form inside the code. Therefore is it accessible to the analyst who will
always succeed in finding and accessing it. Instead of performing cryptanalysis,
a simple decoding/deciphering operation is sufficient.
It is therefore necessary to consider keys that are external to the encrypted
code. Two cases are possible [9]:
– Environmental key management introduced in [22] and developped in [9].
The code gathers information in its execution environment and calculates
the key repeatedly. The correct key will be computed when and only when
the suitable conditions will be realized in the code environment – which is
usually under the control of the code designer. The security model should
prohibit dictionary attacks or environment reduction attacks (enabling re-
duced exhaustive search) by the code analyst. Consequently the analyst must
examine the code in an controlled dynamic area (sandbox or virtual machine)
and wait until suitable conditions are met without knowing when they will
be. However it is possible to build more operational scenarii for this case and
to detect that the code is being analyzed and controlled [9].
– Use of k-ary codes [3,12] in which a program is no longer a single monolithic
binary entity but a set of binaries and non executable files (working in a
serial mode or in a parallel mode) to produce a desired final (malicious or
not) action. Then the analyst has a reduced view on the whole code only
since generally he can access a limited subset of this k-set. In the context
of (legitimate) code protection, one of the files will be a kernel-land module
communicating with a userland code to protect. The code without the ap-
propriate operating environment – with a user-specific configuration by the
administrator – will never work. This solution has the great advantage of
hiding (by outsourcing it), the encryption system itself. It is one particular
instance with respect to this last solution that we present in this paper.
3 Case Studies
In this section we are going to illustrate our approach with simple but powerful
cases. Without loss of generality and for sake of clarity, we consider a reduced
case in which only a very few instructions are protected against any disassembly
attempt. Of course any real case – as we did in LibThor – will consider far more
instructions, especially all critical ones (those defining the CFG for instance).
3.1 The working context
The LibThor library initiated and mainly developped by Anthony Desnos [4,20]
uses virtual machines (VM) as the core tool. Virtual Machines offer a powerful
protection for an algorithm or anything else that we would like to protect against
reverse engineering. We can have a lot of different VMs piled up (like Russian
dolls) into a software. This technique must be combined with classical techniques
since it is just a one more step towards code protection.
In LibThor, the main goal of VMs is to build a simple code which interprets
another one. The idea is to take a piece of x86 assembly instructions and to have
a simple, dynamic, metamorphic VMs very quickly to interpret it. It is worth
stressing on the fact that you can embed different VM into the same program
to protect differents parts.
In Desnos’ LibThor VMs are codes which interpret an intermediate repre-
sentation (IR) derived from the REIL language [5]. So a translation between
x86 assembly instructions and the chosen IR is performed. The VM is totaly
independent from the LIBC or anything like that. The main goal of the VM is
to run an algorithm into an encapsulated object (which can be loaded anywhere;
in fact it is a simple shellcode), but the main feature of the VM is to have a
different version of it at each generation for a same code so if we want to protect
a simple instruction X, we can build a new VM every time to protect the same
X. This new VM will be different from the previous one.
Moreover everything must be dynamic. Therefore we must have simple work-
ing rules:
– the bytecode must be dynamic and hidden by using the malicious cryptog-
raphy tools (malicious PNRG) we are exposing hereafter;
– information must be dynamic (area for each context, the offset for each
register in the context...);
– the code must be transformed with the internal LibThor metamorphic pack-
age (in which malicious PNRG can used used too);
– integer constants can be hidden with LibThor internal junk package. This is
very useful to hide opcode values, register offsets or anything which represent
any invariant in a program. Here again malicious PRNGs play a critical role.
During the code generation (mutation), we use the LibThor metamorphic
package a lot of times on a function. We have several steps during a generation:
1. Obfuscation of C source code.
2. Compiling the C source code of the VM into a library.
3. Extraction of interesting functions from the library.
4. Transformation of x86 assembly instructions into IR.
5. Obfuscation of IR by using metamorphic package.
6. Transformation of IR into bytecode.
7. Creation of dynamic functions to handle the bytecode.
8. Obfuscation of functions by using the metamorphic package. The mutated
code is produced here and the malicious PRNG is mainly involved here.
9. Assembly of all parts to have a simple shellcode.
Our PRNG is essentially dedicated to the protection of the bytecode which is
the final result of the transformation: X86 ASM → REIL IR → bytecode. Here
is an illustrating example:
[X86 ASM] MOV EAX, 0x3 [B803000000]
[REIL IR] STR (0x3, B4, 1, 0), (EAX, B4, 0, 0)
[BYTECODES] 0xF1010000 0x40004 0x3 0x0 0x6A
We have five fields in the bytecode corresponding respectively to :
– 0xF1010000
• 0xF1: the opcode of the instruction (STR),
• 0x01: specifies that it is an integer value,
• 0x00: useless with respect to this instruction,
• 0x00: specifies that it is a register.
– 0x40004
• 0x04: the size of the first operand,
• 0x00: useless with respect this instruction,
• 0x04: the size of the third operand,
– 0x3: direct value of the integer,
– 0x0: useless with respect to this instruction,
– 0x6A: value of the register.
In this setting the 0x00 values (useless with respect this instruction) contribute
directly to the TRANSEC aspect. Now that the working environment is defined,
let us explain how a malicious PRNG can efficiently protect the opcode values
while generating them dynamically.
4 Malicious PRNG
Sophisticated polymorphic/metamorphic or obfuscation techniques must rely on
PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator). In the context of this paper, the
aim is to generate sequences of random numbers (here bytecode values) on-the-
fly while hiding the code behavior.
Sequences are precomputed and we have to design a generator which will
afterwards output those data. The idea is that any data produced by the resulting
generator will be first used by the code as a valid address, and then will itself
seed the PNRG to produce the next random data.
Three cases are to be considered:
1. the code is built from any arbitrary random sequence;
2. the sequence is given by a (non yet protected) instance of bytecode and we
have to design an instance of PNRG accordingly;
3. a more interesting problem lies in producing random data that can be some-
how interpreted by a PRNG as meaningful instructions like jump 0x89 di-
rectly.
This relates to interesting problems of PRNG cryptanalysis. We are going to
address these three cases.
From a general point of view it is necessary to recall that for both three
cases the malware author needs reproducible random sequences. By reproducible
(hence the term of pseudo-random), we mean that the malware will replay this
sequence to operate its course of actions. The reproducibility condition implies
to consider a deterministic Finite-State Machine (dFSM). The general scheme
of how this dFSM is working is illustrated as follows. Without the dFSM, any
instruction data whenever executed produced a data used the next instruction
(e.g. an address, an operand...).
I0 → D0 → I1 → D1 . . .→ Di → I(i + 1)→ . . .
Any analysis of the code will easily reveal to the malware analyst all the mal-
ware internals since all instructions are hardcoded. But if a few data/instructions
are kept under an encrypted form, and deciphered at execution only, the analysis
is likely to be far more difficult (up to decryptor and the secret key protection
issue). It is denied of a priori analysis capabilities. So we intend to have
I0 → D′0 → I1 → D1 . . .→ D′i → I(i + 1)→ . . .
where dFSM(D′i) = Di for all i. Upon execution, we just have to input data
D′i into the dFSM which will then output the data Di. A few critical points are
worth stressing on
1. no key is neither required nor used;
2. instructions can similarly protected as well.
Of course to be useful as a prevention tool against analysis, the dFSM must itself
be obfuscated and protected against analysis. But this last point is supposed
to be fulfilled. We will show a more powerful implementation by using K-ary
malware in Section 5.
4.1 (Malware) Code Built From an Arbitrary Sequence
In this case, the sequence is arbitrary chosen before the design of the code and
hence the code is written directly from this arbitrary sequence. This case is the
most simple to manage. We just have to choose carefully the dFSM we need.
One of the best choice is to take a congruential generator since it implies a very
reduced algorithm with simple instructions.
Let us consider X0 an initial value and the corresponding equation
x(i + 1) = a ∗Xi + b mod(N)
where a is the multiplier, b is the increment and N is the modulus. Since the
length of the sequence involved in the malware design is rather very short (up
to a few tens of bytes), the choice of those parameters is not as critical as it
would be for practical cryptographic applications. In this respect, one can refer
to Knuth’s seminal book to get the best sets of parameters [19].
Here are a few such examples among many others:
Standard minimal generator a = 16, 807− b = 0−N = 231 − 1.
VAX-Marsaglia generator a = 16, 645− b = 0−N = 232.
Lavaux & Jenssens generator a = 31, 167, 285− b = 0−N = 248.
Haynes generator a = 6, 364, 136, 223, 846, 793, 005− b = 0−N = 264.
Kuth’s generator a = 22 695 477− b = 1−N = 232 and Xn+1 >>= 16.
Of course the choice of the modulus is directly depending on the data type used
in the malware.
Another interesting approach is to consider hash functions and S/key. The
principle is almost the same. We take a (m,n) hash function H which produces
a n-bit output from a m-bit input with m > n. In our case we can build m in
the following way
m = <data to protect><padding of random data><size of data>
or equivalently
m = D_i <random data> |D_i|
Then we choose a m-bit initialization vector (IV) and we compute the random
sequence as follows
IV → Di = H(IV )→ x = H |Di|(Di)→ y = H |x|(x)→ H |y|(y)→
The iteration value |Di| can be used to get one or more required arbitrary value
thus anticipating the next case. Of course the nature of the hash function is also
a key parameter: you can either use existing hash function (e.g MD5, SHA-1,
RIPEMD 160, SHA-2...) and keep only a subset of the output bit; or you can
design your own hash function as explained in [19].
4.2 Random Sequence Coming From a Arbitrary (Malware) Code
In this slightly different case, the sequence is determined by a (non yet protected)
instance of a code. This issue is then to design or use an instance of PRNG
accordingly. This is of course a far more difficult issue which implies cryptanalytic
techniques. To formalize the problem we have a sequence
X0, X1, X2 . . . xi . . . Xn
which represents critical data (addresses, ASM instructions, operands...) of a
particular instance of a (malware) code. As for example let us consider three
series of 32-bit integers describing bytecode values as defined in Section 3:
0x2F010000 0x040004 0x3 0x0 0x89 (1)
0x3D010000 0x040004 0x3 0x0 0x50 (2)
0x5010000 0x040004 0x3 0x0 0x8D (3)
They are just different instances of the same instruction [20]. The aim is to have
these data in the code under a non hardcoded form. Then we intend to code
them under an obfuscated form, e.g.
K0,K1,K2, . . .Ki, . . .Kn . . .
We then have to find a dFSM such that
X0 = dFSM(K0), X1 = dFSM(K1) . . . Xi = dFSM(Ki) . . .
The notation Ki directly suggests that the quantity input to the dFSM is a
key in a cryptographic context but these keys have to exhibit local low entropy
profile at the same time. So the malicious PRNG must take this into account as
well. In this case, we have to face a two-fold cryptanalytic issue:
– either fix the output value Xi and find out the key Ki which outputs Xi for
an arbitrary dFSM,
– or for an arbitrary set of pairs (Xi,Ki) design a unique suitable dFSM for
those pairs.
The first case directly relates to a cryptanalytic problem while the second refers
more to the problem of designing cryptographic dFSMs with trapdoors. In our
context of malicious cryptography, the trapdoors here are precisely the arbitrary
pairs of values (Xi,Ki) while the dFSM behaves for any other pair as a strong
cryptosystem [16]. This second issue is far more complex to address and will not
be exposed in this paper (research under way; to be published later).
We will focus on the first case which has been partially addressed for real-life
cryptosystem like Bluetooth E0 [13] in the context of zero knowledge-like proof
of cryptanalysis. But in our case we do not need to consider such systems and
much simpler dFSM can be built conveniently for our purposes: sequences of
data we use are rather short.
We have designed several such dFSMs and we have proceeded to their crypt-
analysis to find out the keys Ki which output the values Xi.
As we will see, those dFSM have to exhibit additional features in order to
– be used for code mutation purposes,
– exhibit TRANSEC properties. In other words, if we have Y = dFSM(X),
then X and Y must have the same entropy profile. Replacing X with a Y
having a higher entropy profile would focus the analyst’s attention.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the mathematical description of a
59-key bit stream cipher (we currently work on block cipher which should offer
more interesting features; to be continued . . . ) we have designed for that purpose.
Other dFSMs with larger key size (up to 256) have been also designed (available
upon request).
The principle is very simple yet powerful: three registers R1, R2 and R3 are
filtered by a Boolean function F , thus outputing bits st (or bytes in a vectorized
version) that are combined to the plaintext (Figure 1). The value Ki initializes
Reg 1
Reg 2
Reg 3
f
s_t
Fig. 1. Malicious 59-bit key deterministic finite state-machine (stream cipher)
the content of registers R1, R2 and R3 at time instant t = 0, and outputs bits s
t
which represent the binary version of values Xi.
The linear feedback polynomials driving the registers are the following:
P1(x) = x
17 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x14 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x2 ⊕ 1
P2(x) = x
19 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P3(x) = x
23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x⊕ 1
where ⊕ denotes the exclusive OR.
The combination function is the Majority function applied on three input
bits and is given by
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3.
An efficient implementation in C language is freely available by contacting the
author. For our purposes, we will use it in a procedure whose prototype is given
by
void sco(unsigned long long int * X, unsigned long long int K)
{
/* K obfuscated value (input), X unobfuscated value (output) */
/* (array of 8 unsigned char) by SCO */
...
}
Now according to the level of obfuscation you need, different ways exist to protect
your critical data inside the code (series of integers (1), (2) and (3) above). We
are going to detail two of them.
Concatenated bytecodes The dFSM outputs critical data under a concate-
nated form to produce chunks of code corresponding to the exact entropy of the
input value (Ki), thus preventing any local increase of the code entropy. For
the dFSM considered, it means that we output series (1), (2) and (3) under the
following form
1)--> 0x2F01000000040004000000030000000000000089
2)--> 0x3D01000000040004000000030000000000000050
3)--> 0x050100000004000400000003000000000000008D
Let us detail the first output sequence (1). It will be encoded as three 59-bit
outputs M1,M2 and M3
M_1 = 0x0BC04000000LL;
M_2 = 0x080008000000060LL;
M_3 = 0x000000000000089LL;
To transform M1,M2 and M3 back into five 32-bit values X1, X2, X3, X4 and
X5, we use the following piece of code:
/* Generate the M_i values */
sco(&M_1, K_1);
sco(&M_2, K_2);
sco(&M_3, K_3);
X_1 = M_1 >> 10; /* X_1 = 0x2F010000L */
X_2 = ((M_2 >> 37) | (M_1 << 22)) & 0xFFFFFFFFL
/* X_2 = 0x00040004L */
X_3 = (M_2 >> 5) & 0xFFFFFFFFL; /* X_3 = 0x3 */
X_4 = ((M_3 >> 32) | (M_2 << 27)) & 0xFFFFFFFFL;
/* X_4 = 0x0 */
X_5 = M_3 & 0xFFFFFFFFL; /* X_5 = 0x89 */
Values M1,M2 and M3 will be stored in the code as the values K1,K2 and K3
with dFSM(Ki) = Mi:
K_1 = 0x6AA006000000099LL;
K_2 = 0x500403000015DC8LL;
K_3 = 0x0E045100001EB8ALL;
Similarly we have for sequence (2)
M_1 = 0x0F404000000LL; K_1 = 0x7514360000053C0LL;
M_2 = 0x080008000000060LL; K_2 = 0x4C07A200000A414LL;
M_3 = 0x000000000000050LL; K_3 = 0x60409500001884ALL;
and for sequence (3)
M_1 = 0x01404000000LL; K_1 = 0x76050E00001F0B1LL;
M_2 = 0x080008000000060LL; K_2 = 0x00000010C80C460LL;
M_3 = 0x00000000000008DLL; K_3 = 0x000000075098031LL;
The main interest of that method is that the interpretation of code is not
straightforward. Code/data alignment does not follow any logic (that is pre-
cisely why we have chosen a 59-bit FSM which is far better that a seemingly
more obvious 64-bit FSM ; any prime value is optimal).
Moreover, as we can notice, the Ki values are themselves sparse as unobfus-
cated opcodes are (structural aspect). Additionally, their entropy profile (quan-
titative aspects) is very similar to the Mi values (and hence the Xi ones). This
implies that any detection techniques based on local entropy picks is bound to
fail.
Due to the careful design of our 59-bit dFSM, we managed to obtain a unicity
distance which is greater than 59 bits (the unicity distance is the minimal size
for a dFSM output to be produced by a single secret key). In our case a large
number of different 59-bit keys can output an arbitrary output sequence. Here
are the results for the three series (1), (2) and (3) (Table 1):
Serie Mi values Number of secret keys Ki
(1) M1 314 (file res11)
(1) M2 2,755 (file res12)
(1) M3 8,177 (file res13)
(2) M1 319 (file res21)
(2) M2 2,755 (file res22)
(2) M3 26,511 (file res23)
(3) M1 9,863 (file res31)
(3) M2 2,755 (file res32)
(3) M3 3,009 (file res33)
Table 1. Number of possible keys for a given output value
This implies that we can randomly select our 9 Mi values and thus we have
314× (2, 755)3 × 8, 177× 319× 26, 511× 9, 863× 3, 009
= 13, 475, 238, 762, 538, 894, 122, 655, 502, 879, 250
different possible code variants. It is approximatively equal to 2103 variants. The
different files (resij with i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) whose name is given in right column of
Table 1 are freely available upon request.
To build a variant, you just have to select data in the nine files randomly
according to the following piece of code (code extract to generate the M1 values
for the first serie (1) only; refer to Section 5 for a secure implementation):
f1 = fopen("res11","r");
f2 = fopen("res12","r");
f3 = fopen("res13","r");
randval = (314.0*(rand()/(1 + RAND_MAX));
for(i = 0; i < randval; i++)
fscanf(f1, %lX %lx %lx\n, &y1,&y2, &y3);
K_1 = y1 | (y2 << 17) | (y3 << 36);
/* do the same for values M_2 and M_3 of serie (1) */
....
/* repeat the same for series (2) and (3) */
....
/* Generate M_1 value for series(1) */
sco(&M_1, K_1);
The different files (resij with i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) can be stored in a program whose
size is less than 400 Kb.
Non concatenated bytecodes In this second case, the dFSM outputs 59-bit
chunks of data whose only the 32 least significant bits are useful. In this case we
output five 59-bit chunks of data M1,M2,M3,M4 and M5. For sequence (1) we
have
M_1 = 0x???????2F010000LL;
M_2 = 0x???????00040004LL;
M_3 = 0x???????00000003LL;
M_4 = 0x???????00000000LL;
M_5 = 0x???????00000089LL;
where ? describes any random nibble. We get the Xi values from the Mi values
with Xi = Mi & 0xFFFFFFFFL;
The main interest of that method is that it naturally and very simply provides
increased polymorphism compared to the previous approach. Indeed about 2140
5-tuples (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) whenever input in our dFSM produces 5-tuples
(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5). Then we can produce a huge number of different instances
of the same code by randomly choosing any possible 5-tuples. By increasing
size of the memory of the FSM we even can arbitrarily increase the number of
possible polymorphic instances.
5 Operational Implementation
The obfuscation techniques we have presented before, which are based on mal-
icous cryptography (malicious, biased PRNG) and cryptanalysis techniques (to
precompute inputs to the dFSM) require obviously to protect the dFSM itself
very strongly. Indeed obtaining the Xi values from the Ki is straightforward
whenever we have the dFSM. We would then come back to the weak existing
implementations and reduce the problem to a simple decoding scheme.
But this obfuscation is impossible to reverse in the context of k-ary malware
[3,12]. In this case, the viral information is not contained in a single code as usual
malware do, but it is split into k different innocent-looking files whose combined
action - serially or in parallel - results in the actual malware behavior and in the
metamorphic code instance generation.
Just imagine a 2-ary code (we can take of course k > 2) made of parts V1 and
V2. Part V1 just embeds the dFSM and wait in memory for values Ki coming
from part V2. Its role is to compute dFSM(Ki) values and send them back to
part V2 according to the protocol summarized by Figure 2. The interpretation of
V
2
: K
iV1 : dFSM
1. Send K
i
2. Return X
i
 = dFSM(K
i
)
Fig. 2. 2-ary implementation of malicious PRNG
data by the reverser (and hence the reversing of the code) is no longer possible
since the dFSM is deported in the part V1 and the analysis of part V2 would
require to reconstruct the dFSM and to break it. This is of course impossible
since the code does not contain a sufficient quantity of encrypted information.
In the case of metamorphism, the part V1 will output a random Ki value
instead during the code instance generation.
From a practical point of view, we have considered different implementations.
Communication pipes Due to the relationship between father and children
processes, only parallel class A or C [12] k-ary codes can be implemented. It
is not the most optimal solution.
Named communication pipes In this case, k-ary parallel class B codes can
be efficiently implemented (the most powerful class since there is no reference
in any part [hence information] to other any part).
System V IPC This is the most powerful method since everything is located
into shared memory.
The source codes of our implementation will be soon publicly available.
In the context of code protection for legitimate purpose, the part V2 will be
a kernel-land module can be user/host specific. It can also be a program located
on a server outside the code analyst’s scope.
6 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that it is possible to prevent code analysis from
reversing while ensuring a high level of metamorphism. Of course, we have to
apply those techniques to all critical parts of the code (especially those which
determine the execution flow). In this case it is obvious that static analysis is
no longer possible. As far as dynamic analysis is concerned, the analyst has to
perform debugging and sandboxing. But using delay detection technique [9] can
trigger a different code behaviour and code mutation.
Our current research and experimentation work is related to non determin-
istic FSMs. In this case any internal state of the FSM results in many possible
outcome (next state at time instant t + 1). Even if is likely to be far beyond
any AV software detection capability, human analysis becomes impossible. Non
deterministic contexts result in untractable complexity.
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